Formulating and designing unforgeable authentication of classical messages in the presence of quantum adversaries has been a challenge, as the familiar classical notions of unforgeability do not directly translate into meaningful notions in the quantum setting. A particular difficulty is how to fairly capture the notion of "predicting an unqueried value" when the adversary can query in quantum superposition. In this work, we uncover serious shortcomings in existing approaches, and propose a new definition. We then support its viability by a number of constructions and characterizations.
Introduction 1.Background.
Large-scale quantum computers will break all widely-deployed public-key cryptography, and may even threaten certain post-quantum candidates [19, 7, 8, 9, 4] . Basic symmetric-key constructions like Feistel ciphers and CBC-MACs also become vulnerable in a quantum attack model [14, 15, 13, 18] , where the adversary is presumed to have quantum query access to some part of the cryptosystem. For example, the adversary may gain access to the unitary operator |x |y → |x |y ⊕ f k (x) where f k is the encryption or decryption function with the key k. While it is unclear if this model is directly relevant to physical implementations of symmetric-key cryptography, it appears necessary in a number of generic settings, such as public-key encryption and hashing with public hash functions. It could also be relevant when private-key primitives are composed in larger protocols, e.g., by exposing circuits via obfuscation [17] . Setting down appropriate security definitions in this quantum attack model is the subject of several threads of recent research [6, 10] .
In this article, we study authentication of classical information in this quantum-secure model. Here, the adversary is granted quantum query access to the signing algorithm of a message authentication code (MAC) or a digital signature scheme, and is tasked with producing valid forgeries. In the purely classical setting, we insist that the forgeries are fresh, i.e., distinct from previous queries to the oracle, so that the security definition does not become vacuous. When the function may be queried in superposition, however, it's unclear how to meaningfully reflect this constraint that a forgery was "unqueried" without ruling out natural, intuitive attacks. For example, consider a uniform superposition query. Simply measuring the output state to get a forgery-a feasible attack against any function-should not be considered a break. On the other hand, an adversary who uses the same query to discover some structural property (e.g., a superpolynomial-size period in the MAC) should be considered successful. Examples like these indicate the difficulty of the problem. How do we correctly "price" the queries? How do we decide if a forgery is fresh? Furthermore, how do we do this in a manner that is consistent with these examples, and many others? This problem has a natural interpretation that goes well beyond cryptography: What does it mean for a classical function to appear unpredictable to a quantum oracle algorithm? 1 Previous approaches. The first approach to this problem was suggested by Boneh and Zhandry [5] . They define a MAC to be unforgeable, if no adversary can useueries to the MAC to produce q + 1 valid inputoutput pairs except with negligible probability. We will refer to this notion as "BZ security" (and k-BZ for the case where the adversary is permitted a maximum of k queries). Boneh and Zhandry prove a number of results about this notion, including that it can be realized by a quantum-secure pseudorandom function (qPRF).
In an approach by Garg, Yuen and Zhandry [11] , a MAC is considered one-time secure if only a trivial "query, measure in computational basis, output result" attack is allowed; we call this notion GYZ. Unfortunately, it is not clear how to extend GYZ beyond the single-query case. Zhandry recently gave a separation example between BZ and GYZ by means of indistinguishability obfuscation [25] .
It is interesting to note that similar problems are present in defining unforgeability for authentication of quantum data. A convincing solution was recently found [2] . This approach relies on the fact that, for quantum messages, authentication implies secrecy; this enables "tricking" the adversary by replacing their queries with "trap" plaintexts to detect replays. As a result, the approach of [2] is inapplicable to the setting of classical messages, where unforgeability and secrecy are orthogonal. Indeed, in situations where unforgeability is required but secrecy is not, adversaries would easily recognize spoofed oracles.
Unresolved issues. BZ security, the only candidate definition of quantum-secure unforgeability in the setting of more than one query, appears to be insufficient for several reasons. First, as observed in [11] , it is a-priori unclear if BZ security rules out adversaries who forge a message in region A after querying the signing oracle on a disjoint message region B. Second, BZ may not capture the unique features of quantum information, such as the destructiveness of measurement. Quantum algorithms must sometimes "consume" (i.e., fully measure) a state to extract some useful information, such as a symmetry in the oracle. It's plausible that, for some MACs, there is an adversary who makes one or more quantum queries but then must consume the post-query states completely in order to make a single convincing forgery.
Despite these philosophical criticisms, prior to this work no BZ-secure schemes have been shown to be manifestly insecure. It is thus essential to gain a concrete understanding of these potential issues, and thereby place the security of MACs and other primitives against quantum attacks on firmer foundations.
Summary of results

The problem with BZ.
Our first result is a construction of a MAC which is forgeable (in a strong intuitive sense) and yet is classified by BZ as secure. Construction 1. Given a triple k = (p, f, g) where p ∈ {0, 1} n and f, g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , define M k : {0, 1} n+1 → {0, 1} 2n by
Consider an adversary that queries only on messages starting with 1, as follows:
Since y |y ⊕ f (x) Y2 = y |y Y2 , discarding the first qubit and Y 2 yields x |x |g p (x) . One can then recover p via period-finding and output (0 p, 0 2n ). We emphasize that the forgery was queried with zero amplitude. One can interpret this attack as, e.g., querying only on messages starting with "From: Alice" and then forging a message starting with "From: Bob". Despite this, we can show that M is BZ-secure. Theorem 1. The family M k (for uniformly random k = (p, f, g)) is BZ-secure.
The BZ security of M relies on a dilemma the adversary faces at each query: either learn an output of f , or obtain a superposition of (x, g(x))-pairs for Fourier sampling. Our proof shows that, once the adversary commits to one of these two choices, the other option is irrevocably lost. Our result can thus be understood as a refinement of an observation of Aaronson: quantumly learning a property sometimes requires uncomputing some information [1] . Note that, while Aaronson could rely on standard (asymptotic) query complexity techniques, our problem is quite fragile: BZ security describes a task which should be hard withueries, but is completely trivial given q + 1 queries. Our proof is inspired by a new quantum random oracle technique of Zhandry [26].
A new definition: Blind-unforgeability.
We then develop a new definition of unpredictability. Given the context of quantum-secure MACs and digital signatures, we call our notion "blind-unforgeability" (or BU). In this approach, we examine the behavior of adversaries in the following experiment. The adversary is granted quantum oracle access to the MAC, "blinded" at a random region B. Specifically, we set B to be a random ǫ-fraction of the message space, and declare that the oracle function will output ⊥ on all of B.
Given a MAC (Mac, Ver), an adversary A, and adversary-selected parameter ǫ, the "blind forgery experiment" is:
1. Generate key k and random blinding B ǫ ; 2. Produce candidate forgery (m, t) ← A BǫMac k (1 n ).
3. Output win if Ver k (m, t) = acc and m ∈ B ǫ ; otherwise output rej.
Definition 1.
A MAC is blind-unforgeable (BU) if for every adversary (A, ǫ), the probability of winning the blind forgery experiment is negligible.
In this work, BU will typically refer to the case where A is an efficient quantum algorithm (QPT) and the oracle is quantum, i.e., |x |y → |x |y ⊕ B ǫ Mac k (x) . We will also consider q-BU, the information-theoretic variant where the total number of queries is a-priori fixed to q. We remark that the above definition is also easy to adapt to other settings, e.g., classical security against PPT adversaries, quantum or classical security for digital signatures, etc.
Results about blind-unforgeability.
Next, we collect a series of results which build up confidence in BU as a viable definition of unforgeability. These results allow us to conclude that BU classifies a wide range of examples (in fact, all examples we have examined) as either forgeable or unforgeable in a way that agrees with our intuition about the meaning of unpredictability. First, we show that BU correctly classifies unforgeability in the classical-query setting. Proposition 1. In the setting of classical queries, BU ⇔ EUF-CMA.
Next, we give a general simulation theorem which tightly controls the deviation in the adversary's behavior when subjected to the BU experiment.
Theorem 2. Let A be a quantum query algorithm making at most T queries. Let F : X → Y be a function, B ǫ a random ǫ-blinding subset of X, and P any function with support B ǫ . Then
The above fact can be viewed as evidence that adversaries that produce "good forgeries" (in any reasonably intuitive sense) will not be disturbed too much by blinding, and will thus in fact also win the BU experiment. We can formulate and prove this intuition explicitly for a wide class of adversaries, as follows. Given an oracle algorithm A, we let supp(A) denote the union of the supports of all the queries of A, taken over all choices of oracle function.
Theorem 3 (informal)
. Let A be QPT and supp(A) ∩ R = ∅ for some R = ∅. Let Mac be a MAC, and suppose A Mack (1 n ) outputs a valid pair (m, Mac k (m)) with m ∈ R with noticeable probability. Then Mac is not BU secure.
A straightforward application of Theorem 3 shows that Construction 1 is BU-insecure. In particular, we have the following. Corollary 1. There exists a BZ-secure MAC which is BU-insecure.
Blind-unforgeable MACs.
Next, we show that several natural constructions satisfy BU. We first show that a random function is blind-unforgeable. Theorem 4. Let R : X → Y be a random function such that 1/|Y | is negligible. Then R is a blind-unforgeable MAC.
By means of results of Zhandry [24] and Boneh and Zhandry [5] , this leads to efficient BU-secure constructions.
Corollary 2. Quantum-secure pseudorandom functions (qPRF) are BU-secure MACs, and (4q+1)-wise independent functions are q-BU-secure MACs.
We can then invoke a recent result about the quantum-security of domain-extension schemes such as NMAC and HMAC [20] , and obtain variable-length BU-secure MACs from any qPRF.
Hash-and-MAC. Consider the following natural variation on the blind-forgery experiment. To blind F : X → Y , we first select a hash function h : X → Z and a blinding set B ǫ ⊆ Z; we then declare that F will be blinded on x ∈ X whenever h(x) ∈ B ǫ . We refer to this as "hash-blinding." We say that a hash function h is a Bernoulli-preserving hash if, for every oracle function F , no QPT can distinguish between an oracle that has been hash-blinded with h, and an oracle that has been blinded in the usual sense.
Recall that the notion of collapsing hash [22] is a quantum analogue of classical collision-resistance, which plays an important role in the construction of post-quantum digital signatures.
Theorem 5. Let h : X → Y be a hash function. If h is a Bernoulli-preserving hash, then it is also collapsing. Moreover, against adversaries with classical oracle access, h is a Bernoulli-preserving hash if and only if it is collision-resistant.
We apply this new notion to show security of the Hash-and-MAC construction
Theorem 6. Let Π = (Mac k , Ver k ) be a BU-secure MAC with Mac k : X → Y , and let h : Z → X a Bernoulli-preserving hash. Then Π h is a BU-secure MAC.
Finally, we show that the Bernoulli-preserving property can be satisfied by pseudorandom constructions, as well as a (public-key) hash based on lossy functions from the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption [16, 21] .
Preliminaries
Basic notation, conventions. Given a finite set X, the notation x ∈ R X will mean that x is a uniformly random element of X. Given a subset B of a set X, let χ B : X → {0, 1} denote the characteristic function of B, i.e., χ B (x) = 1 if x ∈ B and χ B (x) = 0 else. When we say that a classical function F is efficiently computable, we mean that there exists a uniform family of deterministic classical circuits which computes F .
We will consider three classes of algorithms: (i.) unrestricted algorithms, modeling computationally unbounded adversaries, (ii.) probabilistic poly-time algorithms (PPTs), modeling classical adversaries, and (iii.) quantum poly-time algorithms (QPTs), modeling quantum adversaries. We assume that the latter two are given as polynomial-time uniform families of circuits. For PPTs, these are probabilistic circuits. For QPTs, they are quantum circuits, which may contain both unitary gates and measurements. We will often assume (without loss of generality) that the measurements are postponed to the end of the circuit, and that they take place in the computational basis.
Given an algorithm A, we let A(x) denote the (in general, mixed) state output by A on input x. In particular, if A has classical output, then A(x) denotes a probability distribution. Unless otherwise stated, the probability is taken over all random coins and measurements of A, and any randomness used to select the input x. If A is an oracle algorithm and F a classical function, then A F (x) is the mixed state output by A equipped with oracle F and input x; the probability is now also taken over any randomness used to generate F .
We will distinguish between two ways of presenting a function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m as an oracle. First, the usual "classical oracle access" simply means that each oracle call grants one classical invocation x → F (x). This will always be the oracle model for PPTs. Second, "quantum oracle access" will mean that each oracle call grants an invocation of the (n + m)-qubit unitary gate |x |y → |x |y ⊕ F (x) . For us, this will always be the oracle model for QPTs. Note that both QPTs and unrestricted algorithms could in principle receive either oracle type.
We will need the following lemma. We use the formulation from [6, Lemma 2.1], which is a special case of a more general "pinching lemma" of Hayashi [12] . Lemma 1. Let A be a quantum algorithm and x ∈ {0, 1} * . Let A 0 be another quantum algorithm obtained from A by pausing A at an arbitrary stage of execution, performing a measurement that obtains one of k outcomes, and then resuming A. Then Pr[A 0 (1
We denote the trace distance between states ρ and σ by δ(ρ, σ). Recall that this is simply half the trace norm of the difference, i.e., δ(ρ, σ) = 1 2 ρ − σ 1 . When ρ and σ are classical probability distributions, the trace distance is equal to the total variation distance.
Quantum-secure pseudorandomness. A quantum-secure pseudorandom function (qPRF) is a family of classical, deterministic, efficiently-computable functions which appear random to QPT adversaries with quantum oracle access.
Definition 2. An efficiently computable function family
Here F Y X denotes the set of all functions from X to Y . The standard "GGM+GL" construction of a PRF yields a qPRF when instantiated with a quantum-secure one-way function [24] . One can also construct a qPRF directly from LWE [24]. If we have an a-priori bound on the number of allowed queries, then a computational assumption is not needed.
Theorem 7 (Lemma 6.4 in [5] ). Let q, c ≥ 0 be integers, and f : K × X → Y a (2q + c)-wise independent family of functions. Let D be an algorithm making no more thanuantum oracle queries and c classical oracle queries. Then Pr
BZ-unforgeability. Boneh and Zhandry define unforgeability (against quantum queries) for classical MACs as follows [5] . They also show that random functions satisfy this notion.
Definition 3. Let Π = (KeyGen, Mac, Ver) be a MAC with message set X. Consider the following experiment with an algorithm A:
Generate forgeries:
A receives quantum oracle for Mac k , makesueries, and outputs a string s;
3.
Outcome: output win if s contains q + 1 distinct input-output pairs of Mac k , and fail otherwise.
We say that Π is BZ-secure if no adversary can succeed at the above experiment with better than negligible probability.
The Fourier Oracle. Our separation proof will make use of a new technique of Zhandry [26] for working with random oracles. We now briefly describe this idea. A random function f from n bits to m bits can be viewed as the outcome of a quantum measurement. More precisely, let H F = x∈{0,1} n H Fx , where
y∈{0,1} m |y , and where M Fx denotes the measurement of the register F x in the computational basis. This measurement commutes with any CNOT A:B gate with control qubit A in F x and target qubit B outside F x . It follows that, for any quantum algorithm making queries to a random oracle, the output distribution is identical if the algorithm is instead run with the following oracle: 
where lex(x) denotes the position of x in the lexicographic ordering of {0, 1} n , and we defined the Fourier basis state |φ y = H ⊗m |y . In the rest of this section, we freely change the order in which tensor products are written, and keep track of the tensor factors through the use of subscripts. This adjusted representation is called the Fourier oracle (FO), and we denote its oracle unitary by
An essential fact about the FO is that each query can only change the number of non-zero entries in the FO's register by at most one. To formalize this idea, we define the "number operator"
The number operator can also be written in its spectral decomposition,
lP l where
Note that the initial joint state of a quantum query algorithm and the oracle (in the FO-oracle picture described above) is in the image of P 0 . The following fact is essential for working with the Fourier Oracle; the proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. The number operator satisfies
In particular, the joint state of a quantum query algorithm and the oracle after the q-th query is in the kernel of P l for all l > q.
3 The problem with BZ-unforgeability
Intuition, and some obstacles
We begin by motivating our search for a new definition of unforgeability for quantum-secure authentication. We point out a significant security concern not addressed by the existing definition (BZ security) [5] . Before getting to the specifics, we briefly discuss some intuition behind the problem with BZ security, as well as some obstacles to making this intuition concrete.
One intuitive concern about BZ is that it might rule out adversaries who have to measure and thereby "fully destroy" one or more post-query states before they can produce an interesting forgery. At first, constructing such an example does not seem difficult. For instance, let us look at one-time BZ, and construct a MAC from a qPRF f by sampling a key k for f and a superpolynomially-large prime p, and setting
This MAC is forgeable: a quantum adversary can use a single query to perform period-finding on the MAC, and then forge at 0 n . Intuitively, it seems plausible that the MAC might be 1-BZ secure, since period-finding uses a full measurement, and the outputs of the MAC are random everywhere else. As it turns out, this is incorrect, and for a somewhat subtle reason: identifying the hidden symmetry does not fully consume the post-query state. On the contrary, the fact that the period-finding measurement succeeds with high probability implies that the measured post-query state is not too different from the unmeasured post-query state. In particular, one can still extract an input-output pair of f k from the measured post-query state. More generally, let A f be an algorithm that makes a uniform-superposition query to some function f and then outputs a property p(f ) with non-negligible probability δ. Let |ψ = x |x |f (x) denote the post-query state, and consider applying to |ψ the POVM {E p } p which identifies the property (but measures nothing else.) By assumption, there exists a particular POVM element (i.e., E p(f ) ) that is observed with probability δ. This implies that |ψ ψ| has roughly √ δ overlap with the post-measurement state ρ := E p(f ) |ψ ψ|E † p(f ) . This means that, even after extracting p(f ), measuring ρ in the computational basis will result in a random input-output pair of f with probability δ = 1/poly(n).
One can also try an idea similar to (4) but with Simon's problem rather than period-finding, with the aim of requiring the adversary to consume O(n) queries in order to produce a single good forgery (e.g., whose tag is the nontrivial element k of the hidden subgroup.) This again fails by similar reasoning: we can make all the queries in parallel, postpone the measurement which identifies k until the end of the algorithm, and then observe that each post-query state is not disturbed too much by this measurement. This allows us to extract input-output pairs from every query, with non-negligible success probability overall.
These rather general features of quantum algorithms make it difficult to instantiate the above intuition about the problems with BZ security with a concrete scheme. We formalize these somewhat surprising observations in Lemma 8 in Appendix B.4.
A counterexample to BZ
In order to construct an explicit function which exemplifies the issues with BZ, we will make use of both the intuition described above, and the well-known (but only partially understood) necessity of uncomputing certain registers when attempting to extract some data from an oracle [1] . Consider the following MAC construction.
Construction 2. Select a uniformly random string p ∈ R {0, 1} n and two random functions f, g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}
n , and define a MAC for n + 1 bit messages by
Consider an adversary that queries as follows
and then discards the first qubit and the Y 2 register; this yields x |x |g p (x) . The adversary can extract p via period-finding from polynomially-many such states, and then output (0 p, 0 2n ). This attack only queries the MAC on messages starting with 1 (e.g., "from Alice"), and then forges at a message which starts with 0 (e.g., "from Bob.") We emphasize that the forgery was never queried, not even with negligible amplitude. It is thus intuitively clear that this MAC does not provide secure authentication. And yet, despite this obvious and intuitive vulnerability, this MAC is in fact BZ-secure.
Theorem 8. The MAC from Construction 2 is BZ-secure.
Proof. Let A be an adversary that makesuantum queries and outputs q + 1 distinct candidate forgeries (where q is selected by A at runtime.) We let this adversary interact with a mixed oracle, where g and p are treated as random variables, and f is represented as a Fourier Oracle as in Section 2. We denote the relevant quantum registers as follows. First, the quantum oracle for Mac k is a unitary operator on three registers: (i.) the (n + 1)-qubit input register X, (ii.) the n-qubit output register Y 1 into which g p : x → g(x mod p) is computed, and (iii.) the n-qubit output register Y 2 which interacts with the Fourier Oracle. We set Y = Y 1 Y 2 . The Fourier Oracle is an (n · 2 n )-qubit register denoted by F , with the subregister corresponding to input x ∈ {0, 1} n denoted by F x . Finally, the workspace of A is a poly(n)-qubit register denoted by E. Let |ψ XY EF denote the final state of A and the Fourier Oracle, after the q + 1 candidate forgeries have been measured, but prior to any other measurements. Recall that each "number projector" P l from Section 2 projects F to the subspace spanned by basis states with exactly l non-zero entries. We apply to |ψ the twooutcome measurement defined by P <q = q−1 l=0 P l and its complementary projector P ≥q = 1−P <q , effectively measuring whether F contains fewer than q non-zero entries (i.e., registers F x containing a state other than 0 n ); note that it cannot contain more than q by Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, applying this measurement decreases the success probability of A at any particular task by a factor 1/2. We handle the two possible outcomes (< q and q) separately.
Case < q: Let |ψ <q XY EF := P <q |ψ XY EF be the post-measurement state. Note that P l |ψ <q = 0 for all l ≥ q, i.e., each basis component of |ψ <q has fewer than q non-zero entries in F . On the other hand, the output of A contains at least q candidate input-output pairs (x i , y i ) of f (since (0 p, 0 2n ) is the only input-output pair of Mac k that does not also contain an input-output pair of f .) We apply the q-outcome measurement to F which asks: "among the registers
, which is the first one to contain 0 n ?" This measurement is defined by projectors
Adding this measurement to A ensures that F xj is in the state 0 n for some j, at the cost of multiplying A's success probability by 1/q (by Lemma 1.) Recalling that, in the Fourier Oracle picture, f (x j ) is the result of QFT-ing and then fully measuring F xj , we see that f (x j ) is now uniformly random and independent of y j . The original A (i.e., without the measurement {Π j } j ) thus succeeded with probability at most q · 2 −n .
2
Case q: We will denote the post-measurement state in this case by |ψ q gp := P q |ψ , emphasizing that the state was produced by interacting with the oracle g p . By the BZ-security of f (Theorem 19) it suffices to show that the correct period p is output by A (by measuring, say, some designated subregister of E of the state |ψ q gp ) with at most negligible probability. Since testing success at outputting p does not involve the register F , we are free to apply any quantum channel to the F register of |ψ q gp . We choose to measure which q subregisters of F are in a non-zero state. This PVM is defined by projectors
where K ⊂ {0, 1} n with |K| = q. Note that P rest = 1 − P q , so the outcome "rest" never occurs for |ψ q gp . In the following we denote by K the random variable obtained from this measurement. We also set some other random variables in boldface to better distinguish them from particular values they can take. Now consider the preparation of the state |ψ q (by A and the Fourier Oracle) with an arbitrary choice of oracle function h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n in place of g p . We will denote this state by |ψ q h . We now show that, conditioned on a particular measurement outcome K, we can arbitrarily relabel the values of h outside K, without affecting the output state of the algorithm.
n with |K| = q and h, h ′ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n a pair of functions satisfying
is the standard oracle unitary for h, and U FO is the Fourier Oracle unitary as described in Section 2. The intermediate states are
and the final state is |ψ h := |ϕ h,q . By Lemma 2, P l |ϕ k,h = 0 for all l > k, so
For the l term in the sum above, the unitary applies q − k queries to P l |ϕ k,h ; by Lemma 2 this term is thus zero unless l = k. We can therefore insert a P k after the k-th query for free when projecting with P q in the end. Explicitly, |ψ
We first show that we can applyP
We are interested in the state P K |ψ XY EF = P K P q |ψ XY EF . We can make a similar argument as above to show that we can project withP K after every query as well. As the FO-unitary is the only one that acts on F , and becauseP K |0 ⊗n2 n = |0 ⊗n2 n , we can even apply the projectorP K before and after each query. We write N = N K + N K c , where
i.e. N K and N K c measure the number of non-zero entries inside and outside K, respectively. Lemma 2 applies to N K and N K c separately, and
and using the same argument as above, that
and hence
implying N K c |ψ k = 0. But the projector onto the zero-eigenspace of
With an even simpler argument we can insert a projector P =0 Y2 = (1 − |0 0|) Y2 before every query. This is because U FO |0 Y2 |γ XF = |0 Y2 |γ XF , and therefore the number operator eignenvalue does not increase.
To show that U
F is independent of the values outside K, we observe that for all x / ∈ K, y ∈ {0, 1} n \ {0 n } and for all states |γ Y1EF , we have
where we have used that for all x / ∈ K it holds that |0 0| FxPK =P K . This implies that our artificial
This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
We now continue with the "case q" proof of Theorem 8. We bound A's success probability separately for each outcome K. Indeed, it suffices to show that for all K ⊂ {0, 1} n , |K| = q the probability that the output contains a pair (0 p, 0 2n ) is negligible if A continues with
in place of |ψ . We show that the periodic oracle can be replaced by a non-periodic one, except with negligible probability. More precisely, if p ′ is A's output, there exists an event E such that Pr
n . In the following, let us denote the oracle for the MAC of Construction 2 with functions f and g and period p by O f,gp . We define
n be a transversal for p (i.e., a maximal set such that for x, y ∈ T K,p it holds that x = y mod p) such that T K,p ∩ K = K. Using this transversal, we can define for each K a random periodic function g
that is identically distributed with g p , as follows.
For a unitary algorithmÃ that makes ℓ queries to an oracle O f,gp , we define the following procedures:
Procedure 0
1. Sample f , g and p.
2. RunÃ with oracle O f,gp resulting in a final adversary-oracle state |ψ . Apply the measurement {P ≥ℓ , P <ℓ } to F . If outcome is < ℓ, output "fail."
3. Measure K. If p ∈ P bad K , output "bad." Otherwise, let |ψ be the post-measurement state of adversary and oracle, i.e. |ψ = P K P ≥ℓ |ψ = P K |ψ .
Output (K, p, |ψ ).
Procedure 0 K Same as Procedure 0, except with oracle O f,g
1. Sample f and g.
2.
Run A with an oracle O f,g0 resulting in a final adversary-oracle state |ψ . Apply the measurement {P ≥ℓ , P <ℓ } to F . If outcome is < ℓ, output "fail."
3. Measure K and sample p. If p ∈ P bad K , output "bad." Otherwise, let |ψ be the post-measurement state of adversary and oracle, i.e. |ψ = P K P ≥ℓ |ψ = P K |ψ .
Output (K, p, |ψ ).
We first observe that for all K, the outputs of procedures 0 and 0 K are identically distributed because g p and g p,K are. Note that for any fixed K, P K P q = P K ; this, together with Lemma 3, implies that
It follows that, still for a fixed K,
This implies also that in any of the three procedures, conditioned on the event that the output is neither "fail" nor "bad" and on a fixed first output K, p is uniformly distributed on {0, 1} n \ P bad . In other words,
Let us denote the event that a procedure outputs a triple (K, p, |ψ ) by "good."
In what follows, we fix a particular period p, an outcome of the period-sampling step (step 1 in Procedures 0 and 0 K and step 3 in Procedure 1). Given a number ℓ of queries we identify three subspaces of H F corresponding to the three outcomes "good," "bad" and "fail" of the procedures above:
We emphasize that the decomposition defined by these subspaces depends on the aforementioned period p. We let P ℓ i for i ∈ {good, bad, fail} denote the projectors onto these subsets. By the above reasoning we know that for any algorithm that makes ℓ queries to an oracle O and has final state |ψ
It is easy to see that when another query is made, i.e. the ℓ + 1st query of some algorithm, some transitions from S ℓ i to S ℓ+1,p j are impossible. We only need one impossibility, namely that according to Lemma 2, P ℓ+1 i U FO P ℓ fail = 0 for all i = fail. In words, once an adversary has fallen behind his q-query plan of making one non-trivial query to f in every query, he can never catch up. Also note that for ℓ = 0, S ℓ fail = S ℓ bad = 0. It is now easy to show by induction that for a q-query adversary A with final adversary-oracle state |φ it holds that
where |φ ℓ is the adversary oracle state before the ℓth query. The induction step is proven as follows. Assume the above formula is true for q. Then we have for a (q + 1)-query adversary A with final adversary-oracle state |φ
Here we have used the unitary invariance of the Euclidean together with the observation that the state |φ is obtained from the state |ψ q+1 right after the (q + 1)-st query of A by a unitary acting on the adversary's space only and which therefore commutes with P q bad in the first, the triangle inequality in the second line, the observation that P ℓ+1 i U FO P ℓ fail = 0 in the third line, and the fact that P ∞ ≤ 1 for any projector P in the fourth line. In the fifth line we use the same argument as in the first line, just for |φ q+1 and |ψ q . This proves Equation (23).
It remains to bound P
. To this end, suppose that we measure the X-register of |φ ℓ in the computational basis with outcome X ℓ , as well as K (ℓ−1) the set of nonzero registers in F . According to Equations (18) and (19), we have that X ℓ and p are independent and p is uniformly distributed on {0, 1} n \ P bad K conditioned on p / ∈ P bad K and K = K for a fixed (ℓ − 1)-element set K. It follows that
Here the last inequality holds for some 0 < c < c ′ and large enough n, and we have used in the third line that there exists a constant c ′ > 0 such that the number of divisors of an integer M is bounded by 2 c log M log log M which also implies
n , |K| = ℓ. We would now like to relate the above probability to
To this end we analyze how the operator P
good behaves on states of the form |x X ⊗ |φ y ⊗ |ζ EF such that (P K ) F |ζ EF = |ζ EF for some fixed K ∋ x and p ∈ {0, 1} n such that p ∈ P bad K . We calculate
In the first equation we have use the assumptions that (P K ) F |ζ EF = |ζ EF and p ∈ P bad K ; the rest of the calculation is analogous to Equation (14) . This implies that
and therefore
We therefore calculate for a fixed p,
Using Equation (32) we can bound
Here we have used Equation (32) in the first inequality. The probability in the first line is taken over a run of the adversary with a fixed period and random g and f , and in the other lines the period is picked uniformly at random from {0, 1} n as for a properly generated key in Construction 2. The last two equations together imply
Plugging this into Equation (23) yields
using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality in the second line. This finally implies that the adversary's guess p ′ is equal to p and the measurement < q vs. ≥ q returns ≥ q with probability at most
Here we have used Equation (43) and the uniformity of p conditioned on p / ∈ P bad K and K = K in the last line.
Remark. As we will later show, this BZ-secure MAC is not secure in our proposed notion of blindunforgeability. It's not hard to see that it is also not GYZ-secure. Indeed, observe that the forging adversary described above queries on messages starting with 0 only, and then forges successfully on a message starting with 1. If the scheme was GYZ secure, then in the accepting case, the portion of this adversary between the query and the final output would have a simulator which leaves the computational basis invariant. Such a simulator cannot change the first bit of the message from 0 to 1, a contradiction. 4 The new notion: Blind-Unforgeability
Formal definition
For simplicity, our discussion will concentrate on the case of MACs with canonical verification. The case of digital signatures with deterministic signing algorithm is a simple adaptation. We will also later show how to extend our approach to the case of MACs and signatures with non-canonical verification. We begin by defining a "blinding" operation. Let f : X → Y and B ⊆ X. We let
We say that f has been "blinded" by B. In this context, we will be particularly interested in the setting where elements of X are placed in B independently at random with a particular probability ǫ; we let B ǫ denote this random variable. (It will be easy to infer X from context, so we do not reflect it in the notation.)
Next, we define a security game in which an adversary is tasked with using a blinded MAC oracle to produce a valid input-output pair in the blinded set.
Definition 4. Let Π = (KeyGen, Mac, Ver) be a MAC with message set X. Let A be an algorithm, and ǫ : N → [0, 1] an efficiently computable function. The blind forgery experiment BlindForge A,Π (n, ǫ) proceeds as follows:
2. Generate blinding: select B ǫ ⊆ X by placing each m into B ǫ independently with probability ǫ(n).
3.
Produce forgery: (m, t) ← A BǫMac k (1 n ).
4.
Outcome: output 1 (win) if Ver k (m, t) = acc and m ∈ B ǫ ; otherwise output 0 (lose.)
We say that a scheme is blind-unforgeable if, for any efficient adversary, the probability of winning the game is negligible. The probability is taken over the choice of key, the choice of blinding set, and any internal randomness of the adversary. We remark that specifying an adversary requires specifying (in a uniform fashion) both the algorithm A and the blinding function ǫ.
Definition 5.
A MAC Π is blind-unforgeable (BU) if for every polynomial-time uniform adversary (A, ǫ),
We also define the "q-time" variant of the blinded forgery game, which is identical to Definition 4 except that the adversary is only allowed to makeueries to B ǫ Mac k in step (3). We call the resulting game BlindForge 
The above definitions are agnostic regarding the computational class of the adversary and the type of oracle provided. For example, selecting PPT adversaries and classical oracles in Definition 5 yields a definition of classical unforgeability; we will later show that this is equivalent to standard EUF-CMA. The main focus of our work will be on BU against QPTs with quantum oracle access, and q-BU against unrestricted adversaries with quantum oracle access.
Some technical details.
We now remark on a few details in the usage of BU. First, strictly speaking, the blinding sets in the security games above cannot be generated efficiently. However, a pseudorandom blinding set will suffice. Pseudorandom blinding sets can be generated straightforwardly using an appropriate pseudorandom function, such as a PRF against PPTs or a qPRF against QPTs. A precise description of how to perform this pseudorandom blinding is given in the proof of Corollary 3. Note that simulating the blinding requires computing and uncomputing the random function, so we must make two quantum queries for each quantum query of the adversary. Moreover, verifying whether the forgery is in the blinding set at the end requires one additional classical query. This means that (4q + 1)-wise independent functions are both necessary and sufficient for generating blinding sets for q-query adversaries (see [5, Lemma 6.4] .) In any case, an adversary which behaves differently in the random-blinding game versus the pseudorandom-blinding game immediately yields a distinguisher against the corresponding pseudorandom function.
The blinding symbol. There is some flexibility in how one defines the blinding symbol ⊥. In situations where the particular instantiation of the blinding symbol might matter, we will adopt the convention that the blinded version Bf of f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} ℓ is defined by setting Bf : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} ℓ+1 , where Bf (m) = 0 ℓ ||1 if m ∈ B and Bf (m) = f (m)||0 otherwise. One advantage of this convention (i.e., that ⊥ = 0 ℓ ||1) is that we can compute on and/or measure the blinded bit (i.e., the (ℓ + 1)-st bit) without affecting the output register of the function. This will also turn out to be convenient for uncomputation.
Non-canonical verification. Some care is needed when using the above definitions for MACs and digital signatures with non-canonical verification. Consider the following MAC. Let F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a random function, and define Mac(m) = F (m)||0 and Ver(m, t||b) = δ t,F (m) . Forging is trivial: we query on 0 n and flip the last bit of the tag, producing the valid and fresh pair (0 n , F (0 n )||1). And yet, this MAC is BU secure: producing either F (x)||0 or F (x)||1 for a blinded x would imply an efficient algorithm that predicts values of F . (We will later show that random functions are BU-secure.)
This issue is addressed with a simple and natural adjustment: we blind (message, tag) pairs rather than just messages. We briefly describe this for the case of MACs. Let Π = (KeyGen, Mac, Ver) be a MAC with message set M , randomness set R and tag set T , so that Mac k : M × R → T and Ver k : M × T → {acc, rej} for every k ← KeyGen. Given a parameter ǫ and an adversary A, the blind forgery game proceeds as follows:
1. Generate key: k ← KeyGen; generate blinding: select B ǫ ⊆ M × T by placing pairs (m, t) in B ǫ independently with probability ǫ;
2. Produce forgery: produce (m, t) by executing A(1 n ) with quantum oracle access to the function
where r is sampled uniformly for each oracle call.
3. Outcome: output 1 if Ver k (m, t) = acc ∧ (m, t) ∈ B ǫ ; otherwise output 0.
Security is then defined as before: Π is secure if for all adversaries A (and their declared ǫ), the success probability at winning the above game is negligible. Note that, for the case of canonical MACs, this definition coincides with Definition 5.
Intuitive security and the meaning of BU
In this section, we gather a number of results which build confidence in BU as a correct definition of unforgeability in our setting. We begin by showing that a wide range of "intuitively forgeable" MACs (indeed, all such examples we have examined) are correctly characterized by BU as insecure.
Intuitively forgeable schemes
As indicated earlier, BU security rules out any MACs where an attacker can query a subset of the message space and forge outside that region. To make this claim precise, we first define the query support supp(A) of an oracle algorithm A. Let A be a quantum query algorithm with oracle access to the quantum oracle O for a classical function from n to m bits. Without loss of generality, A proceeds by applying a sequence of unitaries OU q OU q−1 · · · OU 1 to the initial state |0 XY Z , followed by a POVM E. Here, X and Y are the input and output registers of the function and Z is the algorithm's workspace. Let |ψ i be the intermediate state of A after the application of U i . Then supp(A) is defined to be the set of input strings x such that there exists a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m such that x| X |ψ i = 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, ..., q} when O = O f .
Theorem 9. Let A be a QPT such that supp(A) ∩ R = ∅ for some R = ∅. Let Mac be a MAC, and suppose A Mac k (1 n ) outputs a valid pair (m, Mac k (m)) with m ∈ R with non-negligible probability. Then Mac is not BU-secure.
To prove Theorem 9, we will need a fact which controls the change in the output state of an algorithm resulting from applying a blinding to its oracle. Given an oracle algorithm A and two oracles F and G, the trace distance between the output of A with oracle F and with oracle G is denoted by δ(A F (1 n ), A G (1 n )). Given two functions F, P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , we define the function F ⊕ P by (F ⊕ P )(x) = F (x) ⊕ P (x).
Theorem 10. Let A be a quantum query algorithm making at most T queries, and F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m a function. Let B ⊆ {0, 1} n be a subset chosen by independently including each element of {0, 1} n with probability ǫ, and P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m be any function with support B. Then
The proof is a relatively straightforward adaptation of a hybrid argument in the spirit of the lower bound for Grover search [3] . We provide the complete proof in Appendix B.1. We are now ready to prove Theorem 9.
Proof of Theorem 9. Let A be a quantum algorithm with supp(A) for any oracle. By our hypothesis,
for some c > 0 and sufficiently large n. Since supp(A) is a fixed set, we can think of sampling a random B ε as picking B 0 := B ε ∩ supp(A) and B 1 := B ε ∩ supp(A) independently. Let "blind" denote the random experiment of A running on Mac k blinded by a random
. The probability that A wins the BU game is
Here the second-to-last step follows from Theorem 10; in the last step, we chose ε = (p/3T ) 2 . We conclude that A breaks the BU security of the MAC. Now recall the adversary against the BZ-secure (but intuitively insecure) Construction 2, as described in Section 3.2. This yields the following.
Theorem 11. The MAC from Construction 2 is BU-insecure.
Relationship to other definitions
In the purely classical setting, our notion is equivalent to EUF-CMA. In the strong unforgeability case, this means BU with blinding on message-tag pairs, as described in Section 4.1.1.
Proposition 2. A MAC is EUF-CMA if and only if it is blind-unforgeable against classical adversaries.
Proof. Set F k = Mac k . Consider an adversary A which violates EUF-CMA. Such an adversary, given 1 n and oracle access to F k (for k ∈ R {0, 1} n ), produces a fresh forgery (m, t) with non-negligible probability s(n) This same adversary (when coupled with an appropriate ǫ) breaks the MAC under the BU definition. Specifically, let p(n) be the running time of A, in which case A clearly makes no more than p(n) queries, and define ǫ(n) = 1/p(n). Consider now a particular k ∈ {0, 1} n and a particular sequence r of random coins for A F k (1 n ). If this run of A results in a forgery (m, t), observe that with probability at least (1 − ǫ)
in the choice of B ǫ , we have F k (q) = B ǫ F k (q) for every query q made by A. On the other hand, B ǫ (m) = ⊥ with (independent) probability ǫ. It follows that the winning probability of A in the blind forgery experiment is at least ǫs(n)/e = Ω(s(n)/p(n)).
On the the other hand, suppose that (A, ǫ) is an adversary that wins blind-unforgeability with inversepolynomial probability r(n). Consider now the EUF-CMA adversary A ′ F k (1 n ) which simulates the adversary A (·) (1 n ) by answering oracle queries according to a locally-simulated version of B ǫ F k ; specifically, the adversary A ′ proceeds by drawing a subset B ǫ(n) ⊆ {0, 1} * (pseudorandomly) and answering queries made by A according to B ǫ F . Note that, when x ∈ B ǫ , this query is answered without an oracle call to F (x). In addition, A ′ can construct the set B ǫ "on the fly," by determining, when a particular query q is made by A, whether q ∈ B ǫ and "remembering" this information in case the query is asked again ("lazy sampling"). With probability r(n), A produces a forgery on a point which was not queried by A ′ , as desired. It follows that A ′ produces a (conventional) forgery with non-negligible probability when given F k for k ∈ R {0, 1} n .
As we have shown above, there are examples which are BZ-secure but BU-insecure (and intuitively broken.) An interesting question is whether BU-security implies BZ security. While we do not fully settle this question, we give some indication that this may be the case. Specifically, we show (in Appendix B.2) that any adversary that makes k quantum queries and outputs ck 2 forgeries (for some constant c) with high probability, can also be used to break BU.
Blind-forgery secure schemes
We now show that a number of natural MAC constructions satisfy blind-unforgeability.
Random schemes
Theorem 12. Let R : X → Y be a uniformly random function such that 1/|Y | is negligible in n. Then R is a blind-forgery secure MAC.
Proof. For simplicity, we assume that the function is length-preserving; the proof generalizes easily. Let A be an efficient quantum adversary. The oracle B ǫ R supplied to A during the blind-forgery game is determined entirely by B ǫ and the restriction of R to the complement of B ǫ . On the other hand, the forgery event
depends additionally on values of R at points in B ǫ . To reflect this decomposition, given R and B ǫ define R ǫ : B ǫ → Y to be the restriction of R to the set B ǫ and note that-conditioned on B ǫ R and B ǫ -the random variable R ǫ is drawn uniformly from the space of all (length-preserving) functions from B ǫ into Y . Note, also, that for every n the purported forgery (m, t) ← A BǫR (1 n ) is a (classical) random variable depending only on B ǫ R. In particular, conditioned on B ǫ , (m, t) is independent of R ǫ . It follows that, conditioned on m ∈ B ǫ , that t = R ǫ (m) with probability no more than 1/2 n and hence φ(n, ǫ) ≤ 2 −n , as desired.
Next, we show that a qPRF is a blind-unforgeable MAC.
Corollary 3. Let m and t be poly (n), and F : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} t a qPRF. Then F is a blindforgery-secure fixed-length MAC (with length m(n)).
Proof. For a contradiction, let A be a QPT which wins the blind forgery game for a certain blinding factor ε(n), with running time q(n) and success probability δ(n). We will use A to build a quantum oracle distinguisher D between the qPRF F and the perfectly random function family F t m with the same domain and range.
First, let k = q(n) and let H be a family of (4k + 1)-wise independent functions with domain {0, 1} m and range {0, 1, . . . , 1/ε(n)}. The distinguisher D first samples h ∈ R H. Set B h := h −1 (0). Given its oracle O f , D can implement the function B h f (quantumly) as follows:
|x |y →|x |y |H x |δ h(x),0 → |x |y |H x |δ h(x),0 |f (x)
Here we used the CCNOT (Toffoli) gate from step 2 to 3 (with one control bit reversed), and uncomputed both h and f in the last step. After sampling h, the distinguisher D will execute A with the oracle B h f . If A successfully forges a tag for a message in B h , A ′ outputs "pseudorandom"; otherwise "random." Note that the function B h f is perfectly ǫ-blinded if h is a perfectly random function. Note also that the entire security experiment with A (including the final check to determine if the output forgery is blind) makes at most 2k quantum queries and 1 classical query to h, and is thus (by Theorem 7) identically distributed to the perfect-blinding case.
Finally, by Theorem 12, the probability that D outputs "pseudorandom" when f ∈ R F t m is negligible. By our initial assumption about A, the probability that D outputs "pseudorandom" becomes δ(n) when f ∈ R F . It follows that D distinguishes F from perfectly random.
Next, we give a information-theoretically secure q-time MACs (Definition 6.) Theorem 13. Let H be a (4q + 1)-wise independent function family with range Y , such that 1/|Y | is a negligible function. Then H is a q-time BU-secure MAC.
Proof. Let (A, ǫ) be an adversary for the q-time game BlindForge q A,h (n, ǫ(n)), where h is drawn from H. We will use A to construct a distinguisher D between H and a random oracle. Given access to an oracle O, D first runs A with the blinded oracle BO, where the blinding operation is performed as in the proof of Corollary 3 (i.e., via a (4q + 1)-wise independent function with domain size 1/ǫ(n).) When A is completed, it outputs (m, σ). Next, D queries O on the message m and outputs 1 if and only if O(m) = σ and m ∈ B. Let γ O be the probability of the output being 1.
We consider two cases: (i.) O is drawn as a random oracle R, and (ii.) O is drawn from the family H. By Theorem 7, since D makes only 2q quantum queries and one classical query to O, its output is identical in the two cases. Observe that γ R (respectively, γ H ) is exactly the success probability of A in the blind-forgery game with random oracle R (respectively, H). We know from Theorem 12 that γ R is negligible; it follows that γ H is as well.
Several domain-extension schemes, including NMAC (a.k.a. encrypted cascade), HMAC, and AMAC, can transform a fixed-length qPRF to a qPRF that takes variable-length inputs [20] . As a corollary, starting from a qPRF, we also obtain a number of quantum blind-unforgeable variable-length MACs.
Hash-and-MAC
To authenticate messages of arbitrary length with a fixed-length MAC, it is common practice to first compress a long message by a collision-resistant hash functon and then apply the MAC. This is known as Hash-and-MAC. However, when it comes to BU-security (and quantum security in general), collision-resistance may not be sufficient. We therefore propose a new notion which generalizes collision-resistance in the quantum setting, and show that it is sufficient for Hash-and-MAC with BU security.
Recall that, given a subset B of a set X, χ B : X → {0, 1} denotes the characteristic function of B.
Definition 7 (Bernoulli-preserving hash). Let H : X → Y be an efficiently computable function family. Define the following distributions on subsets of X:
1. B ǫ : generate B ǫ ⊆ X by placing x ∈ B ǫ independently with probability ǫ. Output B ǫ .
B
H ǫ : generate C ǫ ⊆ Y by placing y ∈ C ǫ independently with probability ǫ. Sample h ∈ H and define B
We say that H is a Bernoulli-preserving hash if for all adversaries (A, ǫ),
The motivation for the name is simply that selecting B ǫ can be viewed as a Bernoulli process taking place on the set X, while B h ǫ can be viewed as the pullback (along h) of a Bernoulli process taking place on Y . We show that the standard Hash-and-MAC construction will preserve BU security, if we instantiate the hash function with a Bernoulli-preserving hash. Recall that, given a MAC Π = (Mac k , Ver k ) with message set X and a function h :
Theorem 14 (Hash-and-MAC with Bernoulli-preserving hash). Let Π = (Mac k , Ver k ) be a BU-secure MAC with Mac k : X → Y , and let h : Z → X a Bernoulli-preserving hash. Then Π h is a BU-secure MAC.
The proof follows in a straightforward way from the definitions of BU and Bernoulli-preserving hash; the details are in Appendix B.6. In Appendix B, we also provide a number of additional results about Bernoulli-preserving hash functions. These results can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 15.
• If H is a random oracle or a qPRF, then it is a Bernoulli-preserving hash.
• If H is 4q-wise independent, then it is a Bernoulli-preserving hash against q-query adversaries.
• Under the LWE assumption, there is a (public-key) family of Bernoulli-preserving hash functions.
• If we only allow classical oracle access, then the Bernoulli-preserving property is equivalent to standard collision-resistance.
• Bernoulli-preserving hash functions are collapsing.
The collapsing property is another quantum generalization of collision-resistance, proposed in [22] .
[ 
A The Fourier Oracle number operator
Recall the "number operator" N F , defined in Equation (3) from Section 2.
Lemma 4. The number operator satisfies N F , U
Proof. Let |ψ XY EF be an arbitrary query state, where X and Y are the query input and output registers, E is the algorithm's internal register and F is the FO register. We expand the state in the computational basis of X,
Set CNOT A:B = H A CNOT A:B H A and observe that
It follows that
where we have used the definition of the operator norm and the normalization of |ψ XY EF in the last line. For a unitary U and a projector P , it is easy to see that [U, P ] ∞ ≤ 1, as [U, P ] = P U (1−P )−(1−P )U P is a sum of two operators that have orthogonal support and singular values smaller or equal to 1. We therefore get [N F , U XY F ] |ψ XY EF 2 ≤ 1, and as the state |ψ was arbitrary, this implies [N F , U XY F ] ∞ ≤ 1. The example from equation (2) shows that the above is actually an equality. The observation that P l η F = 0 for all l > 0 and an induction argument proves the second statement of the lemma.
B More on Bernoulli-preserving hash
In this section, we prove several results about Bernoulli-preserving hash functions. Recalling Definition 7, we refer to blinding according to B ǫ as "uniform blinding," and blinding according to B H ǫ as "hash blinding." First, we show that random and pseudorandom functions are Bernoulli-preserving, and that this property is equivalent to collision-resistance against classical queries.
Lemma 5. Let H : X → Y be a function such that 1/|Y | is negligible. Then 1. If H is a random oracle or a qPRF, then it is a Bernoulli-preserving hash.
2. If H is 4q-wise independent, then it is a Bernoulli-preserving hash against q-query adversaries.
Proof. The claim for random oracles is obvious: by statistical collision-resistance, uniform blinding is statistically indistinguishable from hash-blinding. The remaining claims follow from the observation that one can simulate one quantum query to χ B h ǫ using two quantum queries to h (see, e.g., the proof of Corollary 3.)
n is Bernoulli-preserving against classical-query adversaries if and only if it is collision-resistant.
Proof. First, the Bernoulli-preserving hash property implies collision-resistance: testing whether two colliding inputs are either i) both not blinded or both blinded, or ii) exactly one of them is blinded, yields always outcome i) when dealing with a hash-blinded oracle and a uniformly random outcome for a blinded oracle and ε = 1/2. On the other hand, consider an adversary A that has inverse polynomial distinguishing advantage between blinding and hash-blinding, and let x 1 , ..., x q be its queries. Assume for a contradiction that with overwhelming probability h(x i ) = h(x j ) for all x i = x j . Then with that same overwhelming probability the blinded and hash-blinded oracles are both blinded independently with probability ε on each x i and are hence statistically indistinguishable, a contradiction. It follows that with non-negligible probability there exist two queries x i = x j such that h(x i ) = h(x j ), i.e., A has found a collision.
Bernoulli-preserving hash from LWE. We have observed that any qPRF is immediately a Bernoullipreserving hash function. Such a hash can be constructed from various quantum-safe computational assumptions (e.g., LWE). Unfortunately, a qPRF requires a secret key, and typically does not give a short digest, which would result in long tags. (In practice, it is probably more convenient and more reliable to instantiate a qPRF from block ciphers, which may not be ideal for message authentication.)
Here we point out that one can also construct a public Bernoulli-preserving hash function based on the quantum security of LWE. Specifically, we show that the collapsing hash function in [21] is also a Bernoullipreserving hash. This construction relies on a lossy function family F : X → Y and a universal hash function G = {g k : Y → Z} k∈K . A lossy function family admits two types of keys: a lossy key s ← D los and an injective key s ← D inj , which are computationally indistinguishable. F s : X → Y under a lossy key s is compressing, i.e., |im(F s )| << |Y |; whereas under an injective key s, F s is injective. See [21, Definition 2] for a formal definition, and [16] for an explicit construction based on LWE. There exist efficient constructions for universal hash families by various means [23] . With these ingredients in hand, one then constructs a hash function family H = {h s,k } by h s,k := g k • F s with public parameters generated by s ← D los , k ← K. The proof of Bernoulli-preserving for this hash function is similar to Unruh's proof that H is collapsing; see Appendix B.7 for details.
Relationship to collapsing. Finally, we relate the Bernoulli-preserving property to another quantum generalization of classical collision-resistance: the collapsing property. Collapsing hash functions are particularly relevant to post-quantum signatures. We first define the collapsing property (slightly rephrasing Unruh's original definition [22] ) as follows. Let h : X → Y be a hash function, and let S X and S XY be the set of quantum states (i.e., density operators) on registers corresponding to the sets X and X × Y , respectively. We define two channels from S X to S XY . First, O h receives X, prepares |0 on Y , applies |x |y → |x |y ⊕ h(x) , and then measures Y fully in the computational basis. Second, O ′ h first applies O h and then also measures X fully in the computational basis.
If the input is a pure state on X, then the output is either a superposition over a fiber h
Definition 8 (Collapsing).
A hash function h is collapsing if for any single-query QPT A, it holds that
To prove that Bernoulli-preserving hash implies collapsing, we need a technical fact. Recall that any subset S ⊆ {0, 1}
n is associated with a two-outcome projective measurement {Π S , 1−Π S } on n qubits defined by Π S = x∈S |x x|. We will write Ξ S for the channel (on n qubits) which applies this measurement.
Lemma 6. Let S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S cn be subsets of {0, 1}
n , each of size 2 n−1 , chosen independently and uniformly at random. Let Ξ Sj denote the two-outcome measurement defined by S j , and denote their compositioñ
. Let Ξ denote the full measurement in the computational basis. Then Pr Ξ = Ξ ≥ 1 − 2 −εn , whenever c ≥ 2 + ε with ε > 0,
A proof is given in Appendix B.3. We remark that, to efficiently implement each Ξ S with a random subset S, we can sample h i : [M ] → [N ] from a pairwise-independent hash family (sampling an independent h i for each i), and then define x ∈ S iff. h(x) ≤ N/2. For any input state x,z α x,z |x, z , we can compute
and then measure |b(x) . Pairwise independence is sufficient by Theorem 7 because only one quantum query is made.
Theorem 17.
If h : X → Y is Bernoulli-preserving, then it is collapsing.
Proof. Let A be an adversary with inverse-polynomial distinguishing power in the collapsing game. Choose n such that X = {0, 1} n . We define k = cn hybrid oracles H 0 , H 1 , . . . , H k , where hybrid H j is a channel from S X to S XY which acts as follows: (1.) adjoin |0 Y and apply the unitary |x X |y Y → |x X |y ⊕ h(x) Y ; (2.) measure the Y register in the computational basis; (3.) repeat j times: (i.) select a uniformly random subset S ⊆ X of size 2 n−1 ; (ii.)apply the two-outcome measurement Ξ S to the X register; (4.) output registers X and Y .
Clearly, H 0 is identical to the O h channel in the collapsing game. By Lemma 6, H k is indistinguishable from the O ′ h . By our initial assumption and the triangle inequality, there exists a j such that
We now build a distinguisher D against the Bernoulli-preserving property (with ǫ = 1/2) of h. It proceeds as follows: (1.) run A(1 n ) and place its query state in register X; (2.) simulate oracle H j on XY (use 2-wise independent hash to select sets S); (3.) prepare an extra qubit in the |0 state in register W , and invoke the oracle for χ B on registers X and W ; (4.) measure and discard register W ; (5.) return XY to A, and output what it outputs.
We now analyze D. After the first two steps of H j (compute h, measure output register) the state of A (running as a subroutine of D) can be expressed as
Here Z is a side information register private to A. Applying the j partial measurements (third step of H j ) then results in a state of the form z x∈M β xz |x |s |z , where M is some subset of h −1 (s). Applying the oracle for χ B into an extra register then yields z x∈M β xz |x |s |z |χ B (x) W . Now consider the two cases of the Bernoulli-preserving game.
First, in the "hash-blinded" case, B = h −1 (C) for some set C ⊆ Y . This implies that χ B (x) = χ C (h(x)) = χ C (s) for all x ∈ M . It follows that W simply contains the classical bit χ C (s); computing this bit, measuring it, and discarding it will thus have no effect. The state returned to A will then be identical to the output of the oracle H j . Second, in the "uniform blinding" case, B is a random subset of X of size 2 n−1 , selected uniformly and independently of everything else in the algorithm thus far. Computing the characteristic function of B into an extra qubit and then measuring and discarding that qubit implements the channel Ξ B , i.e., the measurement {Π B , 1 − Π B }. It follows that the state returned to A will be identical to the output of oracle H j+1 .
By (51), it now follows that D is a successful distinguisher in the Bernoulli-preserving hash game for h, and that h is thus not a Bernoulli-preserving hash.
B.1 A simulation theorem
Theorem 18. Let A be a quantum query algorithm making at most T queries, and F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m a function. Let B ⊆ {0, 1} n be a subset chosen by independently including each element of {0, 1} n with probability ǫ, and P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m be any function with support B. Then
Proof. For a function Q : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , we let O Q denote the unitary map |x |y → |x |y ⊕ Q(x) . Recall that A is specified by a fixed initial state |φ 0 in some finite-dimensional Hilbert space, a sequence of T unitary "computation" operators C 1 , . . . , C k , and a POVM {P i : i ∈ I}. The distribution (on I) resulting from the algorithm applied to the oracle O Q is given by applying the POVM to the state
Recall that if the trace distance between two such states satisfies
then the distance in total variation between the distributions produced by any POVM on these two states is no more than ǫ. In our case, we are interested in controlling E B [δ(φ F , φ P ⊕F )]. Define F ′ = F ⊕ P . In preparation for a standard hybrid argument, define
so that all oracle invocations in ( †) are answered according to O F ′ and all those in ( ‡) are answered according to O F . Since δ is a metric on pure states, we have
Note that δ is invariant under (simultaneous) unitary action, and hence for any F , B, and P ,
For pure states |ψ and |ψ ′ , δ(|ψ , |ψ ′ ) ≤ |ψ − |ψ ′ . Note that |ψ = Π B |ψ + (I − Π B )|ψ , and O P operates identically on (I − Π B )|ψ . Therefore
Let π be a uniformly random element of the symmetric group on {0, 1} n and U π be the unitary operator associated with the permutation π. We have that
Thus we conclude that
B.2 BU implies quadratic BZ
It's interesting to ask if BU-security implies BZ-security, as the BZ definition certainly captures a natural family of attacks that one would like to rule out. We are unable to settle this question completely, but provide some weaker connection. Specifically, we show that if a function is BU-secure, then it is BZ-secure with a weaker definition of BZ-security that forbids an adversary from producing ck 2 forgeries from k queries with high probability.
For this purpose, consider a function M : X → Y and a BZ-type adversary A which, given oracle access to M , makes some k queries and produces ck 2 forgeries (with probability 1); here c ≥ 1 is a constant we set later in the discussion. We consider the behavior of this adversary A BǫM supplied with an oracle B ǫ M blinded at a random set B ǫ . We will show that for an appropriate value of c and ǫ, this adversary produces a family of forgeries which includes at least one blinded forgery with constant probability. Finally selecting one of these forgeries at random produces an adversary that breaks the BU security definition.
Returning to the BZ-adversary A, we say that a particular blinding set B is γ-evasive if
(Note that this event is determined by running A with the unblinded oracle M .) Observing that
We note that (by Markov's inequality),
Similarly, we say that a particular blinding set B is γ-divergent if
where D M is the distribution of outputs of A M and D BM is the distribution of outputs of A BM when M is blinded on set B. In light of Theorem 2,
and it follows by Markov's inequality that Finally, note that the probability that B is (1/2 − δ)-evasive or (1/2 − δ)-divergent is no more than
.
Then it is clear that one can choose the constants δ and c, and the blinding probability ǫ = Θ(1/k 2 ), so that this quantity is a constant bounded away from one. (For example, set δ = 1/6. Then, with ǫ = 1/(144k 2 ) the second term of ( †) above is no more than 1/6; setting c = 288 guarantees the first term is likewise no more than e −2 < 1/6 and the entire expression is a constant less than one. One can achieve better constants with more care, but the quadratic dependence on ǫ in Theorem 2 dictates the quadratic gap between k and the number of forgeries achieved by this simple method of proof.)
Finally, we create a BU adversary for M by running the BZ adversary, blinded as above with ǫ = Θ(1/k 2 ), and selecting one of the ck 2 output values at random.
B.3 Full measurement via random two-outcome measurements
Here we give the proof of Lemma 6, restated below. We remark that the constant c is likely to be improved, and it's not our intention to optimize it since we only need it in an imaginary hybrid game of a reduction proof.
Lemma 7. Let S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S cn be subsets of {0, 1} n each of size 2 n−1 , chosen independently and uniformly at random. Let Ξ Sj denote the two-outcome measurement defined by S j , and denote their compositioñ Ξ := Ξ Scn • Ξ Scn−1 • · · · • Ξ S1 . Let Ξ denote the full measurement in the computational basis. Then
whenever c ≥ 2 + ε with ε > 0.
Proof. We give a combinatorial proof. Consider an arbitrary mixed state of density matrix ρ = (ρ x,y ) x,y∈{0,1} n , the full measurement Ξ on ρ gives
Given a set S ⊆ {0, 1} n , the projective measurement Ξ S on ρ operates as
|x x| ρ |y y| + Namely, Ξ S will zero-out the entries ρ x,y in ρ, where (x ∈ S, y / ∈ S) or (x / ∈ S, y ∈ S). It is easy to verify that the same effect occurs when Ξ and Ξ S are applied to a subsystem of a bipartite state. Now, for any c = 2 + ε with ε > 0, consider sampling S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S cn independently at random, each of size 2 n−1 , and define a few random events:
n , x = y s.t. E x,y .
Observe that if BAD does not occur, it implies that for any x = y, the off-diagonal entry ρ x,y is eliminated by one of Ξ Si , and as a resultΞ = Ξ Scn • . . .
• Ξ S1 will be identical to Ξ. Fix a pair (x, y) with x = y, clearly Pr[E By the union bound,
Therefore we conclude that
B.4 Non-adaptive quantum queries and "double spending"
The following lemma shows that if there exists a non-adaptive quantum algorithm A makingueries to a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m that learns a certain property p(f ), then with inverse polynomial probability, there exists another non-adaptive q-query algorithm that learns p(f ) and q input-output-pairs with inverse polynomial probability. For this to hold, we need to assume that A makes its queries using a blank output register (i.e., initialized in the |0 state). This is the case, e.g., in period-finding and Simon's algorithm.
In the following, denote the set of n-bit-to-m-bit functions by F (n, m).
Lemma 8 (Double spending lemma). Let F ⊆ F (n, m) be a set of functions, P a set, p : F → P a function, and D a probability distribution on F . Suppose there exists a quantum query algorithm A which makes q non-adaptive quantum queries to O f with blank output register for f ← D and outputs p(f ) with 1/poly(n) probability. Then there also exists an algorithm A ′ which makes q non-adaptive quantum queries to O f for f ← D and outputs both p(f ) and q input-output pairs of f with 1/poly(n) probability.
Proof. Let X = {0, 1} n , Y = {0, 1} m and H Z = CZ for Z = X, Y . Set A O (1 n ) = E (O ⊗q |ψ X q ⊗ |0 Y q ) where |ψ is some input state and E = {E p } p∈P is a POVM on H ⊗q X ⊗ H ⊗q Y with outcomes labelled by the possible properties of f . Let |ψ 1 = O ⊗q |ψ X q ⊗ |0 Y q . A outputs p(f ) with inverse polynomial probability, say with probability p succ = ψ 1 |E p(f ) |ψ 1 . It follows that the post-measurement state conditioned on the outcome p(f ),
has inverse polynomial overlap with |ψ 1 ,
This implies immediately that measuring |ψ
in the computational basis will yield q input output pairs of f with inverse polynomial success probability.
We remark that the distribution of input-output pairs is at most 1 − 1/poly(n) far from the distribution one would get by simply measuring immediately after the query of A. This means that, in the case of periodfinding and Simon's algorithm (where the queries are uniform), the input-output pairs will be distinct with non-negligible probability.
B.5 Alternative proof that random functions are BZ-secure Using Lemma 2, we can give a simple proof of the fact that a random function is BZ-secure. Because of its simplicity, and because much of it can be reused to prove a separation between BZ and BU, we provide this proof below.
Theorem 19 ([5]
). An algorithm makinguantum queries to a random oracle f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m produces q + 1 input-output pairs of f with probability at most
Note that the probability bound is within a factor of 2 of the one obtained in [5] , and matches it for q + 1 = 2 k , k ∈ N.
Proof. Let A be an adversary that, when provided with the quantum random oracle f , outputs q+1 candidate input-output pairs. Formally, let ρ (X,Y ) q+1 F be the joint cq-state of the adversary and the FO, where the classical registers (X, Y ) q+1 contain A's output and F is the FO's register. If we wanted to determine the success of A at this point, we would apply the Fourier transform to F , and then measure F and check if the outcome for F xi is y i for each (x i , y i ) output by A.
Note that P l ρ = 0 for all l > q by Lemma 2, i.e., there are at most q entries of F that are nonzero. This implies that the entry corresponding to at least one of the inputs that A has output is, in fact, equal to 0 m . However, this is only true in superposition: different branches of the superposition may have different entries in the state |0 m . We will deal with this issue by thinking about a new algorithm B, which will simulate the entire execution of A (including the oracle) and then perform a small number of additional measurements prior to the success check. The additional measurements will find a pair (x i0 , y i0 ) in (X, Y ) q+1 such that F xi 0 is actually in the state |0 m (in every branch of the superposition.) The probability that y i0 = f (x i0 ) (in the execution of B) will then be 2 −m . We will then apply Lemma 1 to show that the success probability of A is not much better.
We now describe B in detail. Initially, B simulates both A and the oracle. After A has finished, but before the success check is performed, B (which is in the state ρ) applies binary search to the q + 1 inputs that A has output. The goal is to find an input x i0 such that F xi 0 is in state |0 m . We do this using binary measurements that ask "are any of the registers F xi 1 , ..., F xi k in the state |0 m ?" We split up the set S 0 = {x 1 , ..., x q+1 } into two subsets S L 0 = {x 1 , ..., x ⌊(q+1)/2⌋ } and S R 0 = {x ⌊(q+1)/2⌋+1 , ..., x q+1 }, and measure whether F x is in a state different from |0 n for all x ∈ S L 0 . This is done using the binary measurement given by
and it's complementary projector P 0 = 1 − P 1 . If the outcome is no, we set S 1 = S L 0 , if it is yes then we set S 1 = S R 0 . This makes sure that we continue with a set that contains an input such that the corresponding FO register is in state |0
n . Now we repeat the described steps using S 1 in place of S 0 and continue recursively until we encounter a set S l with only one element, say w. Continuing with the success check, we now know that F w is in the state |0 m , which implies that f (w) is uniformly random and independent of A's output. Indeed, a register that is in a pure state is automatically in product with the rest of the universe, and f (w) is determined by applying H ⊗m , which transforms |0 m into |φ 0 , and measuring, which yields a uniformly random outcome. Therefore A's success probability is at most 2 −m . The total number of binary measurements for the binary search procedure is upper-bounded by ⌈log(q + 1)⌉, so an application of Lemma 1 finishes the proof.
Proof. It suffices to observe that one can simulate the oracle for Bf using two calls to an oracle for χ B and two executions of f , as follows.
|x |y |b → |x |y |b |χ B (x) |f (x) → |x |y ⊕ χ B (x) · f (x) |b ⊕ χ B (x) |χ B (x) |f (x) → |x |y ⊕ χ B (x) · f (x) |b ⊕ χ B (x) = |x |y ⊕ Bf (x)
In the second step, we applied the CCNOT (Toffoli) gate to the second register, with the fourth and fifth register as the controls and a CNOT to the third register with the fourth register as a control. With this observation, it is straightforward to turn any distinguisher for B ǫ f vs. B Finally, we show the Bernoulli-preserving hash property for the hash from Section B.
Theorem 21. H is Bernoulli-preserving hash if LWE holds against any efficient quantum distinguisher.
Proof. We proceed in three steps (with help of Lemma 10 below): 1) Since F s is injective under an injective key, it is clearly Bernoulli-preserving hash. As a result, F s , s ← D los must be Bernoulli-preserving hash too, because a lossy key is indistinguishable from an injective key by definition.
2) Then g k is chosen properly so that it is injective when restricted to im(F s ) of lossy key s. Therefore g k is Bernoulli-preserving hash too.
3) Finally, H k,s is Bernoulli-preserving hash by the composition of Bernoulli-preserving hash functions g k and F s .
Lemma 10. Any injective function f is Bernoulli-preserving hash. Given any Bernoulli-preserving hash f : X → Y and g : Y → Z that is Bernoulli-preserving hash on im(f ), then h = g • f is also Bernoullipreserving hash.
Proof. The first part follows by observing that a ε-random subset in the codomain corresponds exactly to a ε-random subset in the domain under inverse of the function. Let O ≈ O ′ denote that two oracles O and O are indistinguishable by any quantum poly-time algorithm. For the second part, we need to show that χ C:C←εX ≈ χ C:C=h −1 (CZ ),CZ ←εZ , where ← ε indicates sampling a random subset of fraction ε. Since f is Bernoulli-preserving hash, we have that 
